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Campaign record

Deno-runtime ClickFix on WordPress

Fake Cloudflare checks on hacked WordPress sites lead to Deno, which runs a Python stealer

Status as last assessed
Active
First seen
2026-06-03
Last seen
2026-06-23
Indicators
4
Sources
1
Targets
Windows
  • Fake browser verification challenge
  • Compromised WordPress site

Original research

This page summarises and structures that research; it is not a substitute for the original.

Researchers: if anything here misrepresents your work, email corrections@clickfixreport.com — we correct within 5 working days, no questions asked.

Summary

Sophos's Counter Threat Unit published this on 11 August 2026 about a campaign it investigated on 3 and 4 June 2026. Script injected into compromised WordPress sites, more than 500 of them, ran environment checks and then showed a Cloudflare-themed prompt asking visitors to run a PowerShell command in Windows Terminal. The command started an MSI whose embedded scripts used winget to install Deno, the legitimate JavaScript runtime, and had it run remote JavaScript from the operators' server. Deno then orchestrated the rest: more PowerShell, reconnaissance, Run-key persistence, and a Python stealer run through pythonw that collects system, browser, extension, wallet and keystroke data. A scheduled task kept Deno fetching fresh script, which on 23 June switched to staging through a TryCloudflare tunnel. Sophos notes that signed Deno builds are less likely to be flagged.

Overlap with other campaigns

We compared the 4 indicators in this record — covering 3 distinct registrable domains — against the 60 other published campaigns in this corpus.

  • No indicator is shared, but the two records use the same registrable domains.

    Shared registrable domain (1)

    • domain, shown defanged for safety: trycloudflare dot com

A shared indicator is the same record cited by both campaigns. A shared registrable domain is weaker evidence and is counted separately, because two campaigns can share a registrable simply by renting subdomains from the same platform.

Execution mechanisms

How the pasted command actually ran, as the published accounts describe it. Every row under “Mechanism” is one this campaign records; “Across the corpus” is the share of the 61 published campaigns in this corpus that record the same one — a baseline we can only state because we hold the whole set.

Execution mechanisms recorded for this campaign, with their frequency across the corpus
MechanismAcross the corpusATT&CK
Clipboard injection31 of 6151%T1204.004
PowerShell29 of 6148%T1059.001
Windows Terminal paste-and-run3 of 615%—
Deno runtime running remote JavaScript1 of 612%—

No other campaign on record combines them. We record a mechanism only where a source describes one: an absent mechanism means nobody wrote it down, not that it did not happen.

Indicators

4 indicators, each present verbatim in at least one of the sources above. Values are shown defanged and are not links to the hosts — the link goes to our page for that indicator. No observation date is recorded for any of them.

“Assessment” is who controls the host, not how dangerous it is. Many of these are compromised legitimate sites whose owners are victims, and they are excluded from every blocklist file we publish.

Not on this record

This record does not yet carry a second publisher's account or our own re-checks of these indicators. Each appears on this page as its own section once it exists; none of it is inferred.

Cite as

ClickFixReport, “Deno-runtime ClickFix on WordPress”, campaign ID 22637bd3, retrieved 2026-10-11, snapshot fb0eed7.

https://clickfixreport.com/campaigns/22637bd3/deno-runtime-clickfix-wordpress

Published under CC BY 4.0. Reuse it, including commercially, with attribution. The date above is when this record last changed, not when you opened it — the page is a versioned record, so that is the date a reader needs to find what you saw.